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Abstract— Security in TrustZone-enabled heterogeneous 
system-on-chip (SoC) is gaining increasing attention for several 
years. Mainly because this type of SoC can be found in more and 
more applications in servers or in the cloud. The inside-SoC 
communication layer is one of the main element of 
heterogeneous SoC; indeed all the data goes through it. 
Monitoring and controlling inside-SoC communications enables 
to fend off attacks before system corruption. In this article, we 
study the feasibility of encrypted data exchange between the 
secure software executed in a trusted execution environment 
(TEE) and the secure logic part of an heterogeneous SoC. 
Experiment are done with a Xilinx Zynq-7010 SoC and two 
lightweight stream ciphers. We show that using lightweight 
stream ciphers is an efficient solution without excessive 
overheads.  
Index Terms— TrustZone-enabled FPGA-SoC, AXI bus, 
lightweight stream cipher, Trivium, Grain. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Modern heterogeneous SoC (such as Xilinx Zynq or Intel 
Cyclone V SoC FPGA) has two parts; a processing system 
part includes hard components and ARM cores, and a 
programmable logic part for custom designs. Both parts 
include the ARM TrustZone technology which is a hardware 
security extension that helps to partition both hardware and 
software resources into two worlds, one secure where high-
value code and data can be protected and one non-secure. The 
communications in this heterogeneous SoC is ensured using 
the system bus like the Advanced eXtensible Interface (AXI) 
bus. From a SoC vendor to another, the name of the two parts 
and the communication bus can change, but the TrustZone 
technology implementation is the same.  
The security of the communication between the two parts 
of a heterogeneous SoC is crucial, particularly when the 
system uses sensible data. Previous works [1, 2] showed that 
a small hardware Trojan inserted in the custom design 
implemented in the programmable logic can compromise not 
only the AXI bus communication but the entire system. The 
hardware Trojan give access to a non-secure software to a 
secure hardware IPs. Moreover, a malicious FIFO inserted in 
the AXI Interconnect (the IP in charge of managing the bus 
communication) stole valuable data and shared it with non-
secure IPs.  
In the literature, several works tackled the security of bus 
communication. The work in [1, 3, 4, 5, and 6] proposed to 
check the security rules directly on the bus in order to not 
degrade the system performances by useless external memory 
access. Supposing that the entire SoC is trusted, Brunel et al. 
[7] proposed Secbus to protect the SoC from the attacks that 
targeted the external memory. In this article, we study for the 
first time the feasibility of using lightweight encryption 
algorithms in order to protect inside-SoC sensitive 
communication. Unlike [7], we suppose that the 
heterogeneous SoC is not completely trusted and we include 
threats like the one presented in [1, 2]. 
The paper is organized as follows: we present the 
encryption scheme and the two lightweight stream ciphers 
(Trivium and Grain-128a) in Section 2, the software and 
hardware performance results with a presentation of the Xilinx 
Zynq-7010 experimental setup in Section 3. Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
II. BUS ENCRYPTION: 
In this section, we present the implementation of the 
encryption scheme and the two lightweight stream ciphers, 
Trivium and Grain-128a. 
A- SoC architecture with secure partition       
The first step for implementing the encryption scheme is 
to make an inside-SoC secure partition of the SoC processing 
system and of the SoC programmable logic both as presented 
in figure 1. The creation of a secure partition of the 
programmable logic should follow the methodology presented 
in [1]. The methodology makes use of TrustZone 
configuration registers and Xilinx Isolation Design Flow 
(IDF). The second step is to include cryptographic elements in 
the secure world in the SoC processing system and in the SoC 
programmable logic both. To do it, a crypto trusted application 
(TA) is load in the trusted execution environment (TEE) of the 
SoC processing system, and a crypto IP is configured in the 
secure hardware area of the programmable logic.  
 
Figure 1: Secure partition of a TrusZone-enabled 
heterogeneous SoC 
 
The crypto IP has four blocks as presented in figure 2. An 
AXI master interface used to communicate with the targeted 
IP in the secure hardware area using decrypted data. An AXI 
slave interface used to exchange encrypted data with the 
crypto TA. A controller used for pre-processing, post-
processing, and scheduling the encryption and the decryption 
operations. A lightweight stream cipher to encrypt and decrypt 
sensitive data.  
 
Figure 2: Crypto IP architecture 
The crypto TA executes a lightweight stream cipher for 
sensitive data encryption and decryption. The crypto TA is 
included in the processing system TEE presented in figure 3. 
The crypto TA is used any time a trusted application want to 
exchange data with a secure Hardware IP.  
 
Figure 3: Processing system TEE  
B- Stream ciphers, Grain-128a, Trivium: 
Stream ciphers are widely known cryptographic primitives 
that allow to perform bulk encryption, they receive as input a 
key K and an initialization vector (IV) and outputs a string of 
pseudorandom bits (stream) which is added using a logical 
Xor operation with the information to be encrypted. The 
decryption process is analogous to encryption, the same K and 
the same IV are necessary to generate the same stream cipher 
in order to Xor it with decrypted data to recover the original 
message. We used two lightweight stream ciphers from the 
hardware portfolio of eSTREAM project [8]: Grain128a [9] 
and Trivium [10]. Below, we provide a detailed description of 
both stream ciphers.   
Grain-128a: 
Grain-128a is a synchronous lightweight stream cipher an 
improvement of Grain-128, it added security enhancements 
and optional message authentication using the Encrypt & 
MAC approach. It has two main parts: Pre-output function and 
a MAC. The pre-output function has an internal state size of 
256 bits, consisting of two registers of size 128 bit: NLFSR 
(b) and LFSR (s). The MAC supports variable tag lengths w 
such that 0 < w ≤ 32. The cipher uses a 128-bit key and an 
Initialization Vector (IV) of 96 bits for the initialization 
process. Grain-128a is part of the Grain family of stream 
ciphers; its throughput can be increased at the expense of 
additional hardware. 
 
Figure 4: Pre-output of Grain-128a 
Trivium: 
Trivium is a synchronous stream cipher designed to 
provide a flexible trade-off between speed and gate count in 
hardware. It uses 80-bit key and an 80-bit IV. It has an internal 
state of 288 bits. The internal state consists of three shift 
registers of different lengths as presented in Figure 5. At each 
round, a bit is shifted into each of the three shift registers using 
a non-linear feedback function with input from that and one 
other register, in the same time one bit of output is produced.  
To initialize the cipher, the key and initialization vector are 
written into two of the shift registers, with the remaining bits 
starting in a fixed pattern, the cipher state is then updated 1152 
times so that every bit of the internal state depends on every 
bit of the key and of the IV in a complex nonlinear way. 
 
Figure 5: Trivium 
III. SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE PERFORMANCE RESULT:    
In this section, we present the target platform Zynq-7010, 
followed by the software and hardware experimental results. 
A- The Xilinx Zynq-7010 setup: 
The Xilinx Zynq-7010 is a TrustZone-enabled 
heterogeneous SoC. During the experiments, the dual ARM 
cortex-A9 in the processing system is running at 600MHz, and 
the custom design included in the programmable design at 
200MHz, the external memory is partitioned into 128MB for 
the secure world and 384MB for the non-secure world. We 
implemented the encryption scheme presented above using a 
custom TEE, and custom design with secure and non-secure 
IPs.  
Interested readers can follow the online tutorial [11] on 
designing a TrustZone-enable system with the Xilinx Vivado 
CAD tool. And check [1] for more detail about securing a 
TrustZone-enable heterogeneous SoC. 
B-   Software performance of the crypto TA: 
We took the source code of Trivium and Grain-128a from 
the reference implementation submitted to eSTREAM [8] and 
then we have modified them to run on the Xilinx Zynq-7010. 
Table 1 shows the size in bits of the different parameters used 
for each stream cipher. We use a counter synchronized with 
the crypto IP as generator of IVs. 
Table 1: Lightweight stream cipher RAM size 
 
 We modified the reference implementations (originally 
bit-oriented) to raise the output rate and speed up the data 
encryption and decryption. We implemented 8-bit, 16-bit and 
32-bit output rates for both algorithms (the Zynq-7010 data 
path is limited to 32-bit). Figure 6 shows the execution time 
of each implementation of both algorithm processing 1MB in 
the Zynq-7010.  
 
Figure 6: Execution time of different implementation of Grain-
128a and Trivium to encrypt 1MB of data. 
In Figure 6 it is clear that Trivium is faster than Grain-
128a; this is because the feedback and output functions used 
by Trivium are less complex than ones use by Grain-128a. 
More complex functions mean more clock cycles for their 
computation on the processors. 
C- Hardware performance of the crypto IP: 
In the programmable logic, we implemented the different 
elements of the crypto IP without the stream cipher block 
using approximately 105 LUTs. The lightweight stream cipher 
blocks were designed based on [9, 10]. Like software 
implementations, we implemented Trivium and Grain-128a 
with different output rate (8-bit/cycles, 16-bit/cycles, and 32-
bit/cycles). Figure 7 shows the initialization time in clock 
cycles taken by each algorithm at the beginning of each 
encryption or decryption. Grain-128a is clocked 256 times and 
Trivium 1152 times without produce any output bit. The 
initialization time decrease linearly with the output rate.  
Figure 8 and 9 show the number of Flip-Flop and the 
number of LUTs required by each implementation of Trivium 
and Grain-128a. The complexity of functions used by Grain-
128a implies the necessity of more LUTs than for Trivium 
which optimizes the number of LUTs. It is directly related to 
the number of variables in each function.  
 
Figure 7: Initialization time of Trivium and Grain-128a  
 
Figure 8: Number of flip flop occupied by Trivium and Grain-128a   
 
Figure 9: Size in LUTs of Trivium and Grain-128a 
D- Introduced overhead: 
The timing overhead introduced by the encryption of the 
AXI bus in the programmable logic is caused by the 
initialization process of the stream ciphers, using the 32-bit 
data-path size it represents 8 and 36 clock cycles for Grain-
128a and Trivium respectively. In the processing system, we 
have measured the execution time of both stream ciphers 
implementations which is equal to 15.3us. Such timing 
overhead are not excessive because the encryption/decryption 
are used only to protect sensitive data processed by the secure 
world. Most of the case, the applications are run in the normal 
world with not any encryption/decryption  
The memory space/area overheads are not excessive too. 
The memory space range required by the crypto TA is 76kB 
to 77KB. That is pretty small compared to the available 
memory (128MB for the secure memory zone in our case). 
The area range in number of slices required by the crypto IP 
is 162 to 697. That equivalent to 0.93% to 3.47% of the Xilinx 
Zynq-7010. When the lightweight cipher data-path is limited 
(from 1 to 8 bits) the area overhead is very limited and allows 
the designer to protect sensitive data efficiently. 
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V. CONCLUSION: 
Inside-SoC communication security is mandatory to 
protect sensitive data in heterogeneous SoC even when 
security mechanism like ARM TrustZone is used. In this paper 
we show that using lightweight stream cipher is an efficient 
solution to secure the communication channel between a TEE 
running in the processing system of the SoC and the secure 
hardware area in the programmable logic. Such work conduce 
to think that FPGA companies should place crypto-resources 
in their heterogeneous SoC to guarantee security and 
performance. 
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